👩‍💻Architecture

Confidential DAO is a privacy-preserving governance platform built with several tightly integrated components. This section provides a deep technical dive into each part of the system, especially the smart contract and cryptographic mechanisms.

1. Smart Contract: ConfidentialDAO.sol

The heart of the system is the ConfidentialDAO contract, which manages proposals, voting, and tally reveals using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE).

Data Structures

  • Proposal struct: Stores all relevant data for a proposal, including encrypted vote tallies, creator, token, end time, and reveal status.

  • proposals[]: Array of all proposals.

  • hasVoted: Mapping to prevent double voting.

Key Functions

createProposal(address token, uint256 durationSeconds)

  • Purpose: Allows any user to create a new proposal by specifying a governance token and voting duration. Requires a proposal fee.

  • How it works: Initializes a Proposal struct with encrypted vote tallies set to zero, sets the end time, and emits a ProposalCreated event.

vote(uint256 proposalId, externalEuint64 encryptedVote, bytes calldata inputProof)

  • Purpose: Lets token holders cast an encrypted vote (For, Against, Abstain) on a proposal.

  • How it works:

    • Checks eligibility (token holder, not already voted, voting still open).

    • Accepts an encrypted vote and a cryptographic proof.

    • Uses FHE to process the encrypted vote and increment the correct tally (For/Against/Abstain) without revealing the vote.

    • Marks the voter as having voted and emits a Voted event.

requestTallyReveal(uint256 proposalId)

  • Purpose: After voting ends, the proposal creator can request the final tally to be decrypted.

  • How it works:

    • Ensures voting is over and the proposal is unresolved.

    • Calls the FHE oracle to decrypt the encrypted tallies.

    • Stores the decryption request ID and emits a TallyRevealRequested event.

resolveTallyCallback(...)

  • Purpose: Called by the FHE oracle to provide the decrypted tallies.

  • How it works:

    • Verifies the oracle's signature.

    • Updates the proposal with the revealed tallies and marks it as resolved.

    • Emits a ProposalResolved event.

View Functions

  • getProposal, getDecryptionRequestId, getRevealStatus, isRevealRequested: Provide proposal and reveal status information to the frontend.

Admin Functions

  • setProposalFee, withdrawFees: Allow the contract owner to set fees and withdraw collected fees.

2. FHE Cryptography

  • Client-side Encryption: Votes are encrypted in the user's browser using FHE libraries (e.g., Zama FHEVM JS/WASM bindings).

  • On-chain Computation: The contract receives only ciphertexts and uses FHE operations to tally votes without ever decrypting them.

  • Decryption Oracle: After voting, the contract requests an off-chain oracle (e.g., Zama FHEVM gateway) to decrypt the final tallies. Only the aggregate result is revealed, never individual votes.

  • Security: The cryptographic proofs ensure that only valid votes are counted, and the oracle's signatures prevent tampering.

3. Frontend (React)

  • Wallet Integration: Users connect via MetaMask or WalletConnect.

  • Proposal Management: Users can create proposals, specifying the governance token and voting period.

  • Voting Flow:

    • User selects a proposal and vote option.

    • Vote is encrypted locally using FHE.

    • A cryptographic proof is generated and sent with the vote to the contract.

    • The UI updates to show voting status and disables further voting for that proposal.

  • Tally Reveal: After voting ends, the proposal creator can trigger the reveal. The UI polls for the revealed tally and displays results.

  • Off-chain Storage: Firebase is used for proposal metadata, notifications, and possibly for storing encrypted votes for analytics.

4. System Flow Diagram

graph TD;
  A[User] -- Connect Wallet --> B[Frontend]
  B -- Encrypt Vote (FHE) --> C[Frontend]
  C -- Submit Encrypted Vote + Proof --> D[ConfidentialDAO.sol]
  D -- Tally Encrypted Votes (FHE) --> D
  D -- Request Tally Reveal --> E[FHE Oracle]
  E -- Decrypt Final Tally --> D
  D -- Publish Results --> B
  B -- Display Results --> A

5. Security & Privacy Considerations

  • No plaintext votes are ever stored or transmitted on-chain.

  • Oracle trust: Only the final tally is decrypted, and signatures are checked for authenticity.

  • Double voting: Prevented by the hasVoted mapping.

  • Token gating: Only token holders can vote on proposals for that token.

This architecture ensures that Confidential DAO achieves its goal of private, secure, and fair decentralized governance.

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